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Capture, Hold, Release: an Ontology of Motion Capture  
 
Introduction 
Three modalities — capture, hold, release — underwrite the affordances of motion 
capture, which operate within a peculiar relationship between digital technology and a 
performer’s movement. Conceptually, these terms help articulate a fundamental 
formal dynamic within the ontology of motion capture proposed below. Motion 
capture is unique among contemporary moving image media in its capacity to re-
perform a performer’s recorded movement a potentially limitless number of times: 
motion data files can be applied to innumerable different computer generated (CG) 
characters or ‘puppets’, and in that sense a singular movement can occupy a series of 
virtual ‘elsewheres’. 
 Motion capture (‘mocap’) is the digital recording of the live action 
performance of human (and other animal) actors, typically in a studio set up for that 
purpose. Mocap presupposes specialist hardware (e.g. an array of twenty-four infra-
red cameras), software, and studio techniques, including system calibration, 
preparation of the capture space and strategic placing of around forty reflective 
markers on an actor's mocap suit. Although reference video footage is often also 
captured on conventional video cameras during a capture session, unlike live action 
cinematography mocap cameras do not produce video footage of the performance: 
rather, each of the twenty-four cameras captures only the XYZ (left to right, up and 
down, and back and forward) spatial coordinates of the markers, by triangulating their 
relative positions over time within the three-dimensional volume of the capture space. 
Over the duration of a recording session, motion data from each of the forty markers, 
captured by all twenty-four cameras builds a comprehensive motion-data set of the 
performance. It is in this sense that the performer’s movement is ‘captured’ by the 
system during the shoot. It is also in the concept of the ‘capturing’ of movement 
(rather than simply recording it), that the motion capture system can be defined as a 
technical process involving a flow of motion data through that system. Central to the 
argument below, is how the mocap system generates peculiarly ‘non-manifest’ 
affordances by way of the data-flow, associated with the system’s unique capacity to 
store motion data as potential movement: movement itself that has a life ‘elsewhere’ 
and at other times, and independent of the performer’s time spent in the live mocap 
recording session.  
 
The aim of this paper is to open up the concept of motion capture to reflections on the 
relationship between (1) motion capture as a system for recording and re-purposing 
motion, and (2) movement as the core asset or ‘life-blood’ that drives and (therefore) 
gives meaning to that system. I compare motion capture to its nearest technical 
equivalent and precursor, rotoscoping, to show how motion capture’s relationship to 
movement emerges through a generative network of relations among affordances both 
imagable and non-imagable. Rotoscoping’s analogue tracing of movement can 
produce similar affects (characters that move with humanlike motion). However, 
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rotoscoping’s fundamental difference is that it must ultimately visualize and therefore 
concretise the movement it captures, in the body of the moving image. Motion 
capture, uniquely, pushes and stretches movement around and through itself, such that 
movement exists as a potentiality both within and outside of, and beyond the technical 
capture system itself. Finally, I propose that movement temporalized in its modes of 
capture, hold release through these relations, suggests an analogy to other generative 
networks, such as writing systems. 
 
Plasticity vs illusion  
Leaving aside one’s visual memory of the performance, and ignoring reference video 
footage and any other photographic documentation, the mocap system does not 
produce legible visual motion imagery. Unlike live-action film, the movement 
extracted from the captured performance lives on, within the inimagable (non-visible, 
non-manifest) domain of the motion data. I have conceptualised motion capture data 
as inimagable to draw attention to how the crucial information that holds the ‘what, 
where and when’ of each marker as it is recorded during a capture session — the 
XYZ coordinates — cannot be represented or manifest in a form that corresponds to 
the phenomenon (performer-movement) to which that information refers. A string of 
numbers is representative of the structure and legibility of that fundamental data as 
data. A motion capture data file (transcribed in text (.txt) file format) typically starts 
with a list of identifiers for each of the markers: e.g. CLAV (‘top of the chest’) LANK 
(‘left outer ankle’) etc. This is followed by hundreds, or even thousands of lines of 
code, as each marker's position is captured as a numeric coordinate in three-
dimensional XYZ-space over the capture session. Motion capture data can be read 
and written in legible script something like this:  
 
Field Time C7:X C7:Y C7:Z CLAV:X CLAV:Y CLAV:Z LANK:X LANK:Y  LANK:Z  
1      0.0000   -62.944  31.271  1378.1  128.62  27.814  1332.7  9.2447  306.52  98.154      
2      0.0083   -62.944  31.271  1378.1  129.1   27.252  1333.2  9.1643  306.44  98.074  
3      0.0167   -62.944  31.271  1378.1  129.34  27.091  1333.6  9.1643  306.36  97.9931 
 
But the crucial movement-information that the data holds in script form has no formal 
(manifest, externalisable) properties outside of its appearance as numeric code. As 
motion data its function is to pass information through the mocap workflow system, 
in much the same way that words and rules of grammar are held within a language 
system to flow among users of that language in specific (spoken, written) language 
acts. The motion data ‘holds’ movement in reserve, out of sight so to speak, in 
inimagable form, but ‘releases’ it in the domain of the digital moving image. In its 
rarefied, inimagable ‘formless’ form within the motion capture system, movement 
itself cannot be a ‘property’ of the motion-data. Ontologically, then (in the way I’m 
proposing it here), movement itself seems to be at one with the (Kantian) categories of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Performance 1 ‘dance_KB3_TXT’ example code. The Motion Capture Lab of the Advanced Computing 
Center for the Arts and Design, Ohio State University, 2003. Source: 
http://accad.osu.edu/research/mocap/mocap_data.htm Accessed 18 May 2015  
	   3	  
time and space, and the motion capture system itself seems to yield the ‘what, where 
and when’ of how this can occur. This conception of movement ascribes it the 
property of a special plasticity whose essential mobility is in movement’s own 
movement: that is, its ability to flow unseen through the technical system of the 
motion capture process. Movement is articulated within the motion capture system, as 
a plasticity that belongs not to the realm of sensory (visual) perception, but to the 
system itself. Mocap performer-movement is released in the form of (say) the 
character Gollum in the ‘Lord of the Rings’ movie trilogy (Dir. Peter Jackson), in 
response to which we can see and describe the manifest properties of how Gollum 
‘moves’ based on the actor Andy Serkis, whose performance was captured in the 
WETA studios some time previously. The plasticity of this (Gollum’s) movement 
comes from how it flows, as motion-data, from one state (a physical performer’s 
body) to another (animated character) as though the system is itself also ‘animated’.  
 
For better or worse, animation’s defining metaphor is securely rooted in its linguistic 
origins: Latin animāre from the proto-Indo-European notion of ‘spirit’; to fill with 
breath, to quicken, to make alive. Animation is for this reason often defined as ‘the 
illusion of life’; provocatively by Cholodenko (2007: 51), and aspirationally by 
Johnston & Thomas (19812). Yet the ‘animacy’ (‘liveliness’) that conceptually 
accompanies any ‘illusion of life’ also attracted Eisenstein to early Disney animation: 
for Eisenstein it was the quality of ‘plasmaticity,’ by which he referred to the way a 
character or object ‘represented in a drawing, a being of a given form, a being that has 
achieved a particular appearance, behaves itself like primordial protoplasm’ 
(Eisenstein, 2013: 15) The notion of a technology (drawing) affording things or 
animating ‘by itself’ invokes an interesting potential ontology of motion captured 
animation: one that offers an alternative to etymological constraints concerning 
‘illusion’, while at the same time recognising that ‘liveliness’ is a strong driver in 
conventional character animation which is increasingly reliant on motion capture to 
assist in finessing character movement (for better or worse). To vivify the character 
Gollum for the ‘Lord of the Rings: The Return of the King’ (Dir. Peter Jackson, 
2003), the actor Andy Serkis performed the role in a motion capture studio, and the 
captured data was then applied to the ‘Gollum’ CG model: character animation is an 
ideal genre through which to explore and test ideas about what is captured and how 
(and Gollum is an ideal example).  
 The tri-fold conception of capture, hold, release, relates an important 
dimension of (Heideggerian) Being to the idea that movement itself is fundamental to 
an ontology or ‘being’ of motion capture: based on temporality and the crucial role of 
inimagable motion data, this conception inverts the relationship between captured 
movement and its formulation in the moving image (e.g. in motion capture 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  The Illusion of Life: Disney Animation (1981) is also the title of a popular animator’s text book, written 
by Ollie Johnston and Frank Thomas, two of nine ‘master animators’ in Walt Disney’s studio. Cholodenko 
distances his use of the term ‘illusion’ in his own two volumes on animation, from that of Walt Disney, describing 
the latter’s ‘illusion’ as “animation aspiring to a realism of depiction such as one associates with Hollywood live 
action cinema” (Cholodenko, 2007, p. 51). 
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animation). At the same time, the proposed ontology challenges the ‘illusion of life’ 
metaphor as a blanket definition of ‘animation’. Animation defined as ‘the illusion of 
life’ draws from animation’s capacity to produce movement. But in its capacity to 
operate outside the domain of the digital moving image, ‘movement itself’ not only 
articulates an ontology of motion capture: motion capture itself can be understood to 
be brought into being by movement, thereby also challenging the notion that motion 
capture (technology and praxis) occupies a parasitic or ‘cannibalistic’ position in 
relation to a performer’s originary performance (Mihailova, 2012). 
 A number of disparate but interrelated concepts are explored here, sparked 
initially by debate about motion capture’s role in animation ‘proper’ (as exercised in 
Oscar nomination rules for Best Animated Feature), but subsequently drawing from 
ideas in Martin Heidegger’s thinking on the nature of Being as embodied in 
temporality. The proposed ontology of motion capture begins with the question: does 
the ‘illusion of life’ metaphor provide a suitable metaphysics for understanding 
animation? Aliveness (animacy) is a driving metaphor for the definition of animation, 
and is a cogent existential link between movement as an observable phenomenon in 
life (Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000), and depictions of animacy itself in art that go back 
some 10,000 years in human history (a history of the relationship and tension between 
techné, poiesis and technologies of representation). Modern technology specifically 
equipped for capturing images of bodies in motion can be placed more than a decade 
prior to the Lumière Brothers’ iconic filming of workers exiting their Lyon factory in 
1895: the multi-camera sequence of a galloping horse (etc.) by Eadweard Muybridge 
(1878) and the chrono-photography of a bird in flight by Étienne-Jules Marey (1882) 
mark important shifts in scientific and perceptual understandings of how bodies 
move, and how (and for what purpose) we might capture this movement. If movement 
is not an illusion (and animation — as the art of the moving image — does not 
necessarily presuppose that it is), but if motion capture animation presupposes a 
different codification of movement compared to ‘conventional’ digital animation 
techniques such as rotoscoping, then what exactly does a motion capture system do 
differently? Motion capture is a tool like any other in the moving image technology 
toolkit. It involves people working with software and hardware, techniques and 
concepts, and the development of practices, pedagogies and creative outcomes. As a 
systematic, practical approach to recording human movement it is especially good at 
capturing real motion in real time very accurately, and digitizing the information in a 
virtually lossless way. When Dave and Max Fleischer developed the rotoscoping 
method they patented in 1917 for ‘Koko the Clown’, the quality of the animation was 
appreciated at the time (1920s) in terms of the quality of Koko’s motions, described 
as ‘smooth and graceful… as a human being’ (Riggs, 2007: 250). The Fleischer’s 
method was painstakingly analogue. It involved hand-tracing each frame of film 
footage to replicate the precise details of a live action performer, by back-projecting 
each image onto translucent paper, hand-touching each drawing and capturing each of 
the images onto film again. More recent digital methods of rotoscoping come close to 
replicating motion capture’s accuracy, but not its inherent capacity to extract motion 
and hold it in reserve. Bob Sabiston developed the Rotoshop software in 2001, which 
	   5	  
filmmaker Richard Linklater used in both ‘Waking Life’ (2001) and ‘Scanner Darkly’ 
(2006). More advanced rotoscoping software continues to be developed (e.g. 
Autoscope3). But if motion capture is so good at what it does (i.e., solves non-trivial 
problems for animators and other creative practitioners), what does motion capture do 
to, or with movement that is unique to such a system? And what, then, would an 
ontology of motion capture need to do to articulate this unique aspect?  
 
Movement itself 
In his essay ‘Laughter: an Essay on the Meaning of the Comic’ Henri Bergson 
articulates animacy through its opposite in the automaton ‘which, through its peculiar 
inelasticity, conveys the impression of pure mechanism, of automatism, of movement 
without life.’ (Bergson, 2009) Bergson’s observation implies that, rather than thinking 
of movement as an illusion from animation, instead we can think of movement itself 
as a quality or a ‘sign’ of being alive. Further: that movement as a sign of ‘being 
itself’ informs an ontology of motion capture in which movement, not the technology, 
is the object of the enquiry. Appropriating Heidegger’s idea of temporality as the 
basis for Being (Dasein) as developed in Being and Time ([1926] 1993), motion 
capture can be conceptualised in the following way: the performer’s movement is 
captured, held and released within the nexus of digital-technical mediations of the 
moving image in which movement (motion) itself is conceptualised as ‘a sign of 
being’. But the ontology I am developing here takes a further conceptual leap: 
namely, that in the motion capture system, movement itself flows according to a 
unique plasticity, between inherently imagable (what can be visualized through the 
moving image technology) and non-imagable modalities.  
 Fundamental to its capacity to visually represent captured movement within 
the moving image, there is a special dimension of motion capture that must remain 
invisible. This involves not a simple addition of the (Aristotelian metaphysical) 
dimension of Time (eternal, infinite) to that of the spatiality of the image. The 
dimension I am describing is (perhaps) a form of temporality itself. This temporal 
dimension exists in the captured motion as it ‘stretches out in time’ beyond what 
appears visually on screen in the particular ‘now’ of the moving image. Motion 
captured movement also refers back to its originary capture session (its own ‘past’), 
and simultaneously points ahead to its own ‘future’. We can imagine this future tense 
as something that is expressed in the potentially infinite iterations that a particular 
actor’s movement can be repurposed, through the motion data carried within the 
motion file, to potentially infinite other CG characters (Gollums). The capacity for 
being both visual and non-visual is fundamental to motion capture’s ontology, and is 
symptomatic of it being digital technology: being digital accounts for how motion 
capture systematises movement across three interrelated modes — of capture, hold 
and release.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  The software developer’s site includes examples of Autoscoped video stills: 
https://www.youtube.com/user/HQcartoons. The software may available for download from various developer 
sites. 
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In Being and Time, Heidegger investigates the ‘existential-ontological constitution’ of 
Being (Dasein), which he argues at the end of his thesis to be ‘grounded in 
temporality’. Heidegger’s work is as much engaged with the ‘problem’ of philosophy 
— especially of a metaphysics of presence within western epistemology — as it is 
with the problem of identifying the nature of Being. (Heidegger, 1993: 488) Jacques 
Derrida and Gilles Deleuze both develop a different formulation of an ontology, not 
of ‘being’ but of ‘difference’. Respectively, they develop a ‘differential ontology’ that 
specifically sets forth difference itself as the constitutive and foundational ontology of 
entities and worlds and how we might think them. While their philosophies are 
radically different, the commonality between the two thinkers is their recognition that 
difference itself, not self-contained identity (presence, or ‘essence’), is the proper 
object of philosophical investigation (thought). Entities are constituted through the 
interrelations of difference, but not through a simple process of comparison of 
discrete identities. Importantly, differential ontology as proposed by Derrida and by 
Deleuze also recognizes the differential structure of time through a move in thought 
away from an Aristotelian puncti-linear structure which conceptualises time as a 
linear series of ‘now-points’. Like Heidegger, they draw instead from Edmund 
Husserl’s idea of time as ‘the living present’ to be understood (thought) through 
experience itself (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, 
1893-1917). A conception of time as fundamentally indivisible, while constitutive of 
the senses of past, present and future, is essential to the ontology of motion capture 
developed here: conceptually and philosophically, but very much through technology, 
the motion capture system pushes and stretches movement (motion) into a unique 
realm of non-visual, radically temporalized re-presentation. Heidegger’s notion of 
three ‘ecstases’ of temporality is particularly relevant here: Heidegger warns that “all 
those significations of ‘future’, ‘past’, and ‘Present’” for ordinary conceptions of time 
have arisen from an ‘inauthentic way of understanding time’ from which argument he 
develops his notion of ‘temporality’. (Heidegger, 1993: 374). For Heidegger, 
temporality can have these three modalities, yet not fall back into a metaphysical or 
abstract (Aristotelian) conception of time. The neologisms and unique (Heideggerian) 
conjunctions make for complicated reading, but Heidegger’s explanation of 
temporality is suggestive of an ontology of motion capture likewise grounded in 
temporality: 
 
The character of ‘having been’ arises from the future, and in such a way that the 
future which ‘has been’ (or better, which ‘is in the process of having been’) releases 
from itself the Present. This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes 
present in the process of having been; we designate it as ‘temporality’. (Heidegger, 
1993: 376) 
 
Ontology 
The origins of formal ontological argument go back to Anselm (1033-1109) 
Archbishop of Canterbury, whose motivation for ontological argument as set out in 
his Proslogium is precisely Anselm’s provocation to prove the existence of God 
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through reason alone. Ontological argument — enquiry into the essence of the 
existence of things — has animated philosophical enquiry since its inception in early 
Greek thought, but continues to inform western metaphysics at its epistemological 
roots. Digital imaging technology has its own ‘mathematical ontology’, the use of 
which (by human and autonomous system operators engaged in data manipulation, 
transfer and storage) ‘foregrounds the existential status of mathematical entities’ 
(Rotman, 2008). Rotman identifies motion on screen with mathematical entities even 
though as ‘ideal objects’ they have no visibility as such, noting a juxtaposition of two 
‘opposed understandings’ of mathematical entities: ‘The classical, orthodox 
viewpoint: mathematical objects as transcendental, invisible and imagined [and] the 
digital, experimental viewpoint: mathematical objects as materializable, variously 
idealizable and imagable.’ The fundamental difference, Rotman argues, is between 
Euclidean ‘contentless, infinitistic and zero dimensional’ entities and ‘a material pixel 
with real, specifiable dimensions and variable informational content’ (Rotman, 2008).  
 Yet, is what we seek from motion capture animation not the visible evidence, 
the ‘imagable’ trace or presence of authentic human (or other) motion in the moving 
image? We are not looking for mathematical entities (one assumes), although 
categorically these things are also present in the character’s antics and are causally 
related to everything that moves as imagery on the screen. We want to see, in the 
fictional character Gollum, the actor Andy Serkis’s authentic originary movement 
(whether we identify the actor or not). This is not to say that motion captured human 
movement is ‘authentic’ in the ordinary and value-laden meaning of the word; i.e. in 
being better than other assisted animation techniques such as rotoscoping. Rather, that 
if it makes any sense at all to have applied Serkis’s actorly performance to the CG 
character Gollum, then it is because the captured motion brings some aspect or quality 
of movement to the CG character’s performance on screen that would otherwise not 
be re-presentable, and manifestly imagable. What is of interest here is that Serkis’s 
captured motions are released in the character Gollum’s movements, yet they are not 
let go (discarded): Serkis’s past action as recorded in the motion studio is a projection 
into the future Gollum (and infinite other Gollums); yet in Gollum we can still 
visually retrieve Serkis’s originary actions.  
 The continuum of visually capturing bodies in motion — expressing 
movement spatially in two- or three-dimensions that includes a temporal register in 
some graphic form — begins in the Palaeolithic era. Researchers (e.g. Azéma & 
Rivère, 2012) have documented cave paintings and drawings that include within their 
representational schemata the means for depicting motion of and within the figure. A 
close reading of these depictions, which feature multi-limbed, offset repetitions of 
animals, demonstrates early human fascination with the power of imaging motion in 
static form. It is hard not to see Marey’s chrono-photography in these images. Yet the 
relationship between motion capture and animation is a strangely contested one,  
brought to the fore by the much-noted 2010 introduction of Rule Seven regarding 
Oscar nominations for animated feature films. The explicitly stated Special Rules for 
the Animated Feature Film Award sets motion capture technology apart from 
animation produced by other means. Rule Seven asserts that ‘movement and 
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characters’ performances are created using a frame-by-frame technique’ and that ‘by 
itself’ motion capture does not qualify as an animation method4. That being said, the 
notion that a technology could do or be anything ‘by itself’ is a strange but promising 
one. On one hand, it threatens to diminish motion capture’s scope to attract robust 
theoretical or philosophical examination, by fixating on the technicality of 
animation’s capacity to represent (human) motion in real time. On the other, Rule 
Seven (however irrelevant to the broader disciplinary discourse of animation) 
presupposes that motion capture has an ‘itself’ too, by dint of technological 
circumstance. 
 
Capture 
Like any other slavish application of a particularly recognisable technique, 
rotoscoping can result in some quite dull sequences. But it very often involves 
capturing the particularities of movement to enable the reworking or re-referencing of 
the subject in relation to its existential, aesthetic, political, historical or narrative 
contexts. Through various graphic treatments, rotoscoping — used performatively5 — 
yields new ideas about its own materiality (Bolt, 2008). Examples include Denis 
Tupicoff’s ‘His Mother’s Voice’ (1997) and ‘Chainsaw’ (2007), Lucette Braune’s 
‘Through You’ (2012), Nadia Micault’s ‘Sonata’ (2013), and Mathieu Labaye’s ‘The 
Labyrinth’ (2013). A particularly good contextualization of the affordances of 
rotoscoping is expressed as ‘a kind of osmosis between the live action and the 
animated version of the film as rotoscoping processes the performances of its actors’ 
(Walden, 2008).  
 The difference between rotoscoping and motion capture, as methods of 
processing an actor’s performance, is not just technical, however. As Richard 
Linklater’s ‘Waking Life’ so wonderfully demonstrates, the direct hand- or software-
assisted analogue tracing introduces deliberate manual or software-derived slippages 
among the visual elements of each frame’s tracing. The ‘osmosis’ at work here 
affords interpretive possibilities within rotoscoping’s representational schemata, 
which ‘Waking Life’ explores through a proximal reference to the original live action 
footage. The absent (redundant) reference footage is more emphatically re-presenced 
in ‘Waking Life’ (than ‘Scanner Darkly’) through a surface treatment that subverts 
the underlying cinematography. As such, the relationship between the live-action and 
rotoscoped elements introduces cognitive-perceptual ambiguity into the viewing 
experience, resulting in a ‘surfaceness’ peculiar to this film’s crafting of its 
animatable imagery (remembering that in the digital domain, everything, ultimately is 
animatable). But there is a defining difference that runs deeper still: motion capture 
implicitly involves both copying, and performing a non-destructive ‘extraction’ of the 
actor’s motion from the physical site of the performance. A motion capture session 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  Oscars.org  Accessed 26 May 2015 
5  I use ‘performative’ not in Lyotard’s sense (associated negatively with deterministic IT discourses of 
capitalism). Rather, performative/performativity here refers to the type of creative effort that pushes a practice or 
technique toward new knowledge. It follows Barbara Bolt’s development of the concept from John Searle, Judith 
Butler and others, in which (citing Butler), performativity is that which ‘involves repetition rather than 
singularity’; it is foundational of creative practice research and in that sense is epistemic. 
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typically involves the actor(s) performing in a clear volume of capture space. They 
may interact with objects and props and with another actor, although no tangible 
physical trace of the studio environment is carried over in ‘imagable’ form to the 
destination CG character. Other information may be missing too. As digital artist Paul 
Kaiser puts it, ‘infrared cameras have only eyes for the reflective markers worn by the 
performing bodies, and not for the bodies themselves’ (Kaiser, 2003: 108). Thus, 
while the position and rotation of the performer’s body is rationalized in Euclidean 
volumetric terms over time, the data files capture and ‘extract’ the movement ‘without 
preserving the performer's mass or musculature. Thus, movement is extracted from 
the performer's body’. (Kaiser, 1999, cited Franko, 2011: 334) Kaiser therefore asks: 
‘Is there beauty in motion seen all on its own, independent of the body that created 
it?’ I would argue that while motion is extracted from the body, it is also captured and 
held. It is not ‘lost’ (nor is it less beautiful if that is a concern). Neither is motion 
capture ‘cannibalistic’ or ‘parasitic’ in relationship to the performer, a view that links 
the capture process to one of erasing or destroying the body of the actor in the process 
of becoming an animated character: for here, motion capture is associated with 
‘absence’ in a negative sense. (Mihailova, 2012) Yet Kaiser’s interests, like mine, are 
less about ‘loss’ than about possibility (for example, the possibility of hand-drawing 
within motion capture), and while his writing is demonstrably from a dance-
choreography discipline (which is outside my domain and beyond the scope of this 
paper), Kaiser is similarly interested in how the motion capture system does things 
with movement:   
 
At the very least, we translate the captured motion into white dots [on a screen] 
corresponding to the markers placed on the body. As soon as those dots start moving, 
we sense the body implied by them, a curiously palpable form in the black void of the 
screen. (Kaiser, 2003:109) 
 
My interest is in how motion captured movement formulates that performer’s 
movement such that this performer’s movement can be independent: that there can be 
a poetics of (human) movement beyond the imagable (where matters of ‘beauty’ 
introduce their own value-laden problematic). Kaiser raises the spectre of captured 
motion ‘suddenly occupy[ing] a radically different kind of time… now close to 
timeless’ and outside of space, ‘since we can now put it down virtually anywhere’, 
and ‘disembodied’ (Kaiser, 2003: 109). But this ‘disembodied’ motion is how 
movement itself is articulated and also extended — vivified — within the motion 
capture process. Importantly, in this process, movement itself articulates motion 
capture’s unique capacity as digital ‘technical media’, to articulate motion within a 
framework of the plasticity of ‘difference’: between the concrete (imagable) and the 
virtual (inimagable movement itself). Through movement, motion capture takes form 
as an idea, at the level of a poetics of time and space through this unique twinning of 
visible and invisible modalities of motion.  
 Rotoscoping, through its interaction with a screen in the tracing process, 
registers the surface schema of its craft through a layering of two-dimensional 
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imagery. Rotoscoping can perform a very similar process of extracting the 
performance and leaving environmental structures behind. The rotoscoper-animator 
has unlimited creative license to give-to and take-from the digital materiality of this 
layered matrix of movement-imagery: the practice of rotoscoping is performative in 
this sense. However, the motion data or ‘mathematical entities’ that (literally) 
underwrite motion capture in an important sense enables a form of ‘becoming’ for 
movement itself. So where the extraction of motion from a performer may be 
philosophically problematic in some contexts, for an ontology of motion capture the 
notion that movement can be conceptualised in this way is a crucial one. Moreover, 
this extraction of movement in a capture session involves a temporalizing — a 
stretching out of time — toward the actor’s future performance that, as an essentially 
analogue method of capturing movement, rotoscoping does not permit. Rotoscoping’s 
ontology in relation to ‘capture’ is that of the surface image that is traced, and 
rotoscoping is nothing if not image-bound according to this analysis. It is in the 
digital-technical formulation of motion capture animation that a temporality for, and 
of the actor’s bodily performance, can be thought to exist — to use a Heideggerian 
turn of phrase — ‘in a process of having been captured’. Any method by which a real 
performer’s movements are visually recorded, captured as motion data in real time, 
codified, stored, and later applied to a ‘digital puppet’, raises a unique set of 
conceptual, aesthetic and technical questions, which typically unfold within ‘the 
digital, the post-humanist and techno-scientific yet affect-induced material turn’ of 
contemporary media and cultural theory (Gaafar & Schulz, 2014: 1).  
 Friedrich Kittler invokes the ‘material turn’ of digital-technical media when he 
states that they involve ‘physical processes which are faster than human perception 
and are only at all susceptible of formulation in the code of modern mathematics’ 
(Kittler, 1996). Motion capture data (like any other digital technology), in the form of 
code on a display screen, is quantifiable and completely legible by an expert 
user/programmer. This code, understood in terms of its purpose as a form of ‘agency’ 
within the motion capture system, is itself imperceptible. But what links this 
inimagable aspect of motion data code to notions of animacy and temporality? 
 Drawing from the etymology of a cluster of terms, ‘animation’ is associated 
with the notion that the inanimate object (a line drawn figure or abstract shape) is 
made ‘alive’ through its movement, embodying a vitality or ‘liveliness’ that appears 
embedded in the particularities of what has changed visibly from frame to frame. We 
do not think it ‘alive’ as such, but we can see animacy in the properties of an object or 
character’s motions. Despite a largely shared genealogy of devices within a 
chronology of optical or ‘philosophical toys’ and their developments as moving image 
technologies, such as the magic lantern and phenakistiscope, animation has at times 
been seen as operating outside of or next to cinematic (live action, feature) film, in 
relation to which it is often marginalised. This is evidenced in the lack of academic 
interest in animation until relatively recently from within film theory; although this is 
changing with ‘some recognition that in the digital era animation is now the central 
aspect of contemporary cinema and not at its margins.’ (Wells, 2012). On this point it 
is worth noting particular arguments among scholars of animation and digital media 
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in general (notably Cholodenko, 1991, 2007; Manovich, 2001; Wells, 2012) who see 
the hierarchy as reversible. Specifically, this reversal is argued according to how the 
originary ‘craft’ of animation — its almost limitless capacity for ‘confluence’ with 
other art forms — makes this possible: namely, that contemporary practices within the 
now predominantly digital moving image industry converge on the inevitable 
‘constructed-ness’ of film in the digital age, whereby resources (footage, 3D CG 
assets) and techniques (compositing, effects, virtual camera) are resources in 
common. This has completely opened up the possibilities of animation ‘and its craft 
per se’ which conceptually, technically and aesthetically instantiates animation as ‘the 
most inclusive’ among the idioms of artistic (visual) representation (Wells, 2012)..  
 If animation’s status as animation can be contextualised within the nexus of 
artisanal ‘constructedness’ of the moving image, motion capture remains within the 
radically inclusive field of the digital moving image. Wells suggests (via Chuck Jones 
on the genius of Tex Avery) that animation can be defined in a number of important 
ways that do not equate to narrative story telling, including ‘the inherent abstraction 
of animated characters and environments’ (Wells, 2012). In the context of framing an 
ontology of motion capture, it may be methodologically helpful to conceptualise 
animation ‘and’ motion capture as identifiable discourses within the larger and multi-
vocal disciplinary domain. Moving away from the ‘illusion of life’ metaphor is a 
move toward understanding animacy as a form of being (life) arising in temporality 
through movement itself. This move in thought facilitates thinking about motion 
capture ‘itself’ without necessarily problematizing motion capture’s relationship to 
animation as the art of the digital moving image.  
 
Hold, Release 
Estonian animator and theorist Ülo Pikkov states that ‘Time is the most important 
agent of the animated film, its invisible protagonist’: 
 
The animated film provides an opportunity to manipulate time, but under no 
condition can time be ignored. This leads to a perplexing magic, which gives life to 
inanimate characters and convinces viewers of the spirituality of things. Achieving 
harmony between internal and external time is true evidence of artistic mastery in 
animated film. (Pikkov, 2010: 53) 
 
Pikkov is not necessarily suggesting that as an ‘agent’ of animation, time has a 
metaphysical status outside of the domain of phenomenal experience, but in Pikkov’s 
definition of animation, the idea of a relationship between ‘internal and external time’ 
in the moving image is a potent one. The ‘manipulation of time’ is inherent to the 
disciplinary practices of animation and Pikkov’s assertion about the importance of 
time in animation ‘itself’ is entirely relevant here. While it does turn somewhat on the 
‘illusion of life’ argument, Pikkov’s focus on time associates the moving image with 
the underlying materiality of animating.  
 At its most critical, creative practice is an engagement with the 
epistemological grounding or assumptions of a given (techno-cultural) domain, which 
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a practice (through the making or performing of specific works, or as a discourse) 
may challenge, subvert or embody through differing forms and modes of empirical 
and conceptual inquiry. If motion capture in itself warrants (re)conceptualising — 
aside from, or in addition to how it is already defined within and through empirical 
practices in the creative arts and (art-)sciences, including of course animation, — then 
an ontology of motion capture might fruitfully locate itself outside of the frameworks 
and discourses of the moving image: outside the spatiality entailed in ‘the image’ 
altogether. Stepping outside of the image’s spatiality naturally looks toward space’s 
other: time. To step aside from the dominance of visuality is also a way toward 
exploring the temporality of non-imagistic forms, such as Murray Krieger explores in 
his exposition of the concept of ‘ekphrasis’. Krieger’s interest is broader than this 
simple summary, but the core idea is very useful: namely, that verbal sequences are 
defined by a temporality (in the process of reading what is written), in contrast to 
which is ‘the spatiality of the pictorial instant’ (Krieger, 1992: 45). For Krieger, what 
ekphrasis accounts for in his conception, ‘is both a miracle and a mirage: a miracle 
because a sequence of actions filled with befores and afters such as language alone 
can trace seems frozen in an instant’s vision…’. (Krieger, 1992: 45) Krieger is 
referring specifically to the absent (but otherwise imagable) object as described in 
poetic language (e.g. Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn). Writing, conceptualised here as 
a system of ‘befores and afters’ with the capacity to ‘trace’ entities in this formulation 
of temporality, raises the question whether motion capture, conceptualised in the form 
of capture, hold and release, is closer in kind to writing than it is to the moving image. 
 The question (perhaps) turns on an idea that Rule Seven discloses about the 
relationship between animation, in its visual-spatial mode of ‘illusion’, and motion 
capture’s fundamental temporality: namely, that motion information from a single 
capture session can drive a potentially infinite future variation of possible other 
character movements. This formulation envisages a formless, inimagable ‘digital 
quickening’ operating from within the kinesic information from the performer on the 
one hand, and the mathematical structures in the motion-data code on the other. What 
holds all these aspects and operations to a particular movement — one that we can 
identify with a particular performer’s actions in a space, — is time (temporality), not 
image. 
 
Conclusion 
I want to draw briefly from Foucault’s writing in History of Madness. One of 
Foucault’s opening images is that of the Narrenschiff or Ship of Fools, ‘these boats 
that drifted from one town to another with their senseless cargo’. (Foucault, 2006: 9) 
All throughout History of Madness is a reminder of the powerful symbolisms that 
associate animation in the form of the sign of healthy vitality (‘liveliness’) to its 
counterpart when absent, in forms of malaise (imbecility, mania, and ‘senselessness’). 
Bergson located a lack of animacy in the ‘inelasticity’ of the automaton. Freida Riggs 
commences her essay ‘The Infinite Quest: Husserl, Bakshi, the Rotoscope and the 
Ring’ (Riggs, 2007: 243) with a quote from TS Eliot’s The Hollow Men: 
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Between the idea 
And the reality 
Between the motion 
And the act 
Falls the Shadow… 
 
But there is an earlier line in The Hollow Men that revisits the notion of animation as 
illusion in a way that returns us to questions of ‘aliveness’, animacy and Being. Eliot 
writes of ‘Paralyzed force, gesture without motion’ (Eliot [1925] 1971; 54). Apart 
from the significations of failure to act well, of regret over bad actions, the ‘hollow 
men’ can be understood to refer to two kinds of immobile, inanimate bodies: that of 
the ‘puppet’ (a reference to Guy Fawkes, a straw-stuffed figure) whose body lacks the 
life-will, and that of the soulless dead (in Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, Mr 
Kurtz operates beyond an ethos of corporate responsibility or empathy). The Zombie 
and the automaton: the animated dead. 
 Heidegger writes that an ontological inquiry is ‘primordial’ (close to us as 
every-day) but will remain ‘naïve and opaque if in its researches into the Being of 
entities it fails to discuss the meaning of Being in general’ and that Dasein — the 
being of Being — ‘is ontologically distinctive in that it is ontological’ (Heidegger, 
1993: 31-32). To set about an ontology of motion capture, following Heidegger’s 
methodology, requires that one first addresses motion capture in its Being. I have 
suggested that in order to do this, it is helpful to think of how motion capture data 
‘holds’ movement itself in inimagable form, such that when movement is ‘released’ in 
the domain of the digital moving image, it occupies a peculiar capacity — a limitless, 
plastic stretching, like the virtual strings of CG puppet — to work across both visual 
and non-visual modalities. This posits temporality, through movement itself, as the 
defining element of the relations among its constitutive ontological aspects. Motion 
capture conceptualized as a relational network of ‘ecstases’ of movement ‘grounded 
in temporality’, is like a writing system, a language, sheer potentiality: an already at-
hand combinatorial motion syntax.  
 Movement is potentiality. Movement, then, is like an asset within the 
economy of the motion capture system: something to be captured and stored (held) as 
motion-to-be within the network, and released for the purpose of animating CG 
puppets. Or perhaps never released, since the motion data might potentially remain 
unused on a hard-drive indefinitely. Motion capture’s ontology is thereby founded on 
how the system’s ‘life-blood’ — movement — exists both as data abstraction (a 
potentiality not yet made use of) and as the animated performance of potentially 
infinite CG puppets. Movement may take tangible (spatialised) form in character 
animation on screens big and small, but it also occupies a spatio-temporality beyond 
what can be imaged there.  
 A passage from Friedrich Kittler’s Discourse Networks: 1800/1900 brings the 
discussion back to the notion of an ontology of motion capture that draws not from 
questions of animacy’s visual-perceptibility or the spatiality of the (moving) image, 
but borrows from the temporality of its own and other systems, such as writing. 
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Kittler’s discussion of computational code is the linking concept here. In his 
Afterword to the Second Printing of his book, Kittler defines ‘discourse network’ as 
‘the network of technologies and institutions that allow a given culture to select, store, 
and process relevant data’ (Kittler, 1990: 369). The term ‘discourse networks’ (in 
German Aufschreibesysteme) relates conceptually, in his work, to media technologies 
whose historicity underwrites and foretells contemporary digital ‘technical media’. 
The term ‘discourse network’ itself draws not from technologies of imaging media 
communication, but from the autobiographical writing of a ‘famous paranoid’, Daniel 
Paul Schreber (1842–1911). In the transcript of his interview with Kittler in 2003, 
interviewer John Armitage notes that the “original term Aufschreibesysteme was first 
used by Schreber in his ‘Memoirs of My Nervous Illness’ to designate how strange 
heavenly powers were tracking and recording his every move.” Armitage points out 
that in German Aufschreibesysteme ‘better translates as ‘notational systems’ or, 
literally, as ‘writing-down systems’ (Armitage, 2006: 37).  
 
There is an irresistible connection here between conceptualising motion capture as 
akin to writing (as an alternative to a visual capturing movement which constrains an 
ontology of motion capture) and Schreber’s description of ‘strange powers tracking 
and recording his every move’ as the technical media for a ‘discourse network’. 
Thinking of motion capture as a system with the capacity for capturing, holding and 
releasing movement — in which movements are akin to poetic phrases emanating 
from within the combinatorial syntax of verbal language — suggests a fruitful 
alternative to understanding motion capture in terms of its capacity, which it shares 
with other moving image systems, for constituting images of movement. In the same 
sense in which our verbal utterances animate the languages we use (such that the 
language system comes into being through our uses of it), movement articulates 
motion capture’s ontology. This conceptualization of motion capture promotes an 
understanding of the technology through its own ‘becoming’, offering an alternative 
to the notion that motion capture technology is negatively instrumentalist (‘parasitic’ 
or ‘cannibalistic’) in its relationship to the capture of a performer’s movement. 
Instead, motion capture technology reveals itself to be like other generative temporal 
technologies, such as the network of phonemes, alphabets and other meaning-making 
systems that are brought into being when we use (release) them for the purpose of 
speaking and writing. 
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